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Abstract
Despite the several successes of deep learning systems, there are
concerns about their limitations, discussed most recently by Gary
Marcus. This paper discusses Marcus’s concerns and some others,
together with solutions to several of these problems provided by the
SP theory of intelligence and its realisation in the SP computer model.
The main advantages of the SP system are: relatively small require-
ments for data and the ability to learn from a single experience; the
ability to model both hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures;
strengths in several kinds of reasoning, including ‘commonsense’ rea-
soning; transparency in the representation of knowledge, and the pro-
vision of an audit trail for all processing; the likelihood that the SP
system could not be fooled into bizarre or eccentric recognition of stim-
uli, as deep learning systems can be; the SP system provides a robust
solution to the problem of ‘catastrophic forgetting’ in deep learning
systems; the SP system provides a theoretically-coherent solution to
the problems of correcting over- and under-generalisations in learn-
ing, and learning correct structures despite errors in data; unlike most
research on deep learning, the SP programme of research draws ex-
tensively on research on human learning, perception, and cognition;
and the SP programme of research has an overarching theory, sup-
ported by evidence, something that is largely missing from research
on deep learning. In general, the SP system provides a much firmer
foundation than deep learning for the development of artificial general
intelligence.
∗Dr Gerry Wolff, BA (Cantab), PhD (Wales), CEng, MBCS, MIEEE; CognitionRe-
search.org, Menai Bridge, UK; jgw@cognitionresearch.org; +44 (0) 1248 712962; +44 (0)
7746 290775; Skype: gerry.wolff; Web: www.cognitionresearch.org.
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1 Introduction
Deep learning has received a great deal of attention, largely because of what
it can do well, but there are concerns about its limitations, discussed most
recently by Gary Marcus [9].
This short paper discusses Marcus’s concerns briefly and some others,
together with solutions to several of these problems provided by the SP theory
of intelligence and its realisation in the SP computer model [18, 17], outlined
in [24, Appendix A] with pointers to where fuller information may be found.1
Several of these solutions have been described in [23, Section V]. Refer-
ences to this paper are made at appropriate points below.
2 What deep learning does well
As Marcus says: “Deep learning, as it is primarily used, is essentially a
statistical technique for classifying patterns, based on sample data, using
neural networks with multiple layers.” [9, p. 3]. Even in applications such
as the playing of games, it seems that the primary function of deep learning
is in the recognition of patterns.
3 Problems with deep learning and how they
may be solved
In this section, the first 10 subheadings are the same as in [9], with the
relevant section number shown at the end of each heading. The remaining
headings are drawn largely from [23, Section V], unless they are already
covered by the first 10 headings.
3.1 Deep learning thus far is data hungry (3.1)
The data-hungry nature of deep learning and how this may be overcome in
the SP system has been discussed quite fully in [23, Section V-E]. There is
also relevant discussion in [23, Section V-D].
In brief, the SP system, like a person, can learn from a single exposure
or experience, and it can begin to form meaningful new structures and gen-
eralisations with exposure to a mere handful of other examples.
1Publications in the SP programme of research, most with download links, may be
found on www.cognitionresearch.org/sp.htm.
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In this connection, the SP system is much more like a child than are deep
learning systems: neuroscientist David Cox has been reported as saying:
“To build a dog detector [with a deep learning system], you need to show the
program thousands of things that are dogs and thousands that aren’t dogs.
My daughter only had to see one dog.” and, the report says, she was happily
pointing out puppies ever since.2
What about the slow learning of complex skills like speaking and under-
standing a new language or how to play a piano? With deep learning, it
is assumed that this kind of slow acquisition of skills may be explained by
the gradual strengthening of links in Hebbian-style learning. By contrast, in
the SP system, the slow learning of complex skills may be explained by the
complexity of the search that is required to find good structures.
In summary, the SP system can explain learning from a single exposure
or experience and it can explain the slow learning of complex skills. By
contrast, a deep learning system can explain the slow learning of complex
skills, but it fails to explain how learning may be achieved with a single
exposure or experience, and more generally, it is excessively demanding in
its requirements for data.
3.2 Deep learning thus far is shallow and has limited
capacity for transfer (3.2)
In [9, Section 3.2], Marcus points out quite rightly that “it is important to
realize that the word ‘deep’ in deep learning refers to a technical, architec-
tural property (the large number of hidden layers used in a modern neural
networks, where there predecessors used only one)” (p. 7).
He goes on to say that it is easy to over-interpret the results from a deep
learning system. For example, “according to a widely-circulated video of the
system learning to play the brick-breaking Atari game Breakout, ‘after 240
minutes of training, [the system] realizes that digging a tunnel through the
wall is the most effective technique to beat the game’. But the system has
learned no such thing; it doesn’t really understand what a tunnel, or what
a wall is; it has just learned specific contingencies for particular scenarios.
Transfer tests—in which the deep reinforcement learning system is confronted
with scenarios that differ in minor ways from the one ones on which the
system was trained show that deep reinforcement learnings solutions are often
extremely superficial.” (p. 8).
The SP system certainly does not provide a comprehensive solution to
2“Inside the moonshot effort to finally figure out the brain”, MIT Technology Review,
2017-10-12, bit.ly/2wRxsOg.
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issues like those just described. In brief, it seems fair to summarise the
strengths and potential of the SP system, and to compare it with deep learn-
ing systems, as follows:
• The SP system has strengths in the representation of diverse kinds of
knowledge, in diverse aspects of intelligence, and in the seamless inte-
gration of diverse kinds of knowledge and diverse aspects of intelligence,
in any combination. These strengths, which all flow from the powerful
concept of SP-multiple-alignment, are summarised in [24, Sections 3, 4,
and 5], with pointers to where fuller information may be found.
• Although the SP system has strengths in the representation of diverse
kinds of knowledge, it seems likely that more research will be required to
understand how the system may learn and represent the great range of
concepts employed by people. There is some discussion in [19, Sections
6.1 and 6.2] about how the system may develop a concept of a three-
dimensional object, and in [19, Section 5.3], there is brief discussion of
the development of concepts like motion and speed.
• At a ‘deep’ level, it seems likely that all kinds of learning, both in
deep learning systems and in the SP system, may be understood as the
learning of statistical contingencies.
3.3 Deep learning thus far has no natural way to deal
with hierarchical structure (3.3)
Computer models developed in a programme of research on language learning
(summarised in [18]) were designed to work by ‘hierarchical chunking’. As one
might expect, these models were good at representing hierarchical structures.
But in the ‘SP’ programme of research—where the aim has been to sim-
plify and integrate observations and concepts across artificial intelligence,
mainstream computing, mathematics, and human learning, perception, and
cognition—hierarchical chunking would not do. The challenge has been to
create a framework that would serve equally well for the representation of
both hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures.
What has proved to be a good solution is the concept of SP-multiple-
alignment, borrowed and adapted from the concept of ‘multiple sequence
alignment’ in bioinformatics. Although the basic idea is to create align-
ments of two or more sequences,3 the framework lends itself very well to the
3It is envisaged that at some stage the SP system will be adapted work with
two-dimensional patterns as well as on-dimensional sequences.
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representation of the kinds of hierarchical structures recognised in linguistic
analysis, as can be seen in Figure 1.
0 t w o k i t t e n s p l a y 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | Nr 5 k i t t e n #Nr | | | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | |
2 | | | N Np Nr #Nr s #N | | | | 2
| | | | | | | | | |
3 D Dp 4 t w o #D | | | | | | | 3
| | | | | | | | |
4 NP D #D N | #N #NP | | | | 4
| | | | | | |
5 | | | Vr 1 p l a y #Vr 5
| | | | |
6 | | | V Vp Vr #Vr #V 6
| | | | | |
7 S Num ; NP | #NP V | #V #S 7
| | | |
8 Num PL ; Np Vp 8
Figure 1: The best SP-multiple-alignment created by the SP computer model
with a store of SP-patterns like those in rows 1 to 8 (representing grammatical
structures, including words) and an SP-pattern representing a sentence to be
parsed shown in row 0.
There is more discussion in [23, Section V-K].
3.4 Deep learning thus far has struggled with open-
ended inference (3.4)
No work has yet been done to explore whether or how the SP system can
model ‘open ended’ inferences but, unlike deep learning systems, it has
strengths in several different forms of reasoning including: one-step ‘de-
ductive’ reasoning; chains of reasoning; abductive reasoning; reasoning with
probabilistic networks and trees; reasoning with ‘rules’; nonmonotonic rea-
soning and reasoning with default values; Bayesian reasoning with ‘explaining
away’; causal reasoning; reasoning that is not supported by evidence; the in-
heritance of attributes in class hierarchies; and inheritance of contexts in
part-whole hierarchies ([17, Chapter 7], [18, Section 10]). Where it is ap-
propriate, probabilities for inferences may be calculated in a straightforward
manner ([17, Section 3.7], [18, Section 4.4]). There is also potential for spatial
reasoning [20, Section V-F.1], and for what-if reasoning [20, Section V-F.2].
There is more discussion in [23, Section V-L].
5
3.5 Deep learning thus far is not sufficiently transpar-
ent (3.5)
Marcus [9, Section 3.5] writes that “Although some strides have been [made]
in visualizing the contributions of individuals nodes in complex networks ...,
most observers would acknowledge that neural networks as a whole remain
something of a black box.” (p. 11).
In this respect, there is a sharp contrast with the SP system [23, Section
V-J]:
• All knowledge stored by the SP system is transparent and open to
inspection.
• In general, knowledge in the SP system is likely to be comprehensible
by people but problems may arise with concepts that have not yet been
well studied in the SP programme of research (Section 3.2).
• There is an audit trail for all processing performed by the SP system
and all conclusions it may reach.
3.6 Deep learning thus far has not been well integrated
with prior knowledge (3.6)
Marcus [9, Section 3.6] writes that “Work in deep learning typically consists
of finding a training database, sets of inputs associated with respective out-
puts, and learn all that is required for the problem by learning the relations
between those inputs and outputs, using whatever clever architectural vari-
ants one might devise, along with techniques for cleaning and augmenting
the data set. With just a handful of exceptions, ..., prior knowledge is often
deliberately minimized.” (p. 11).
Later, he writes that “It also not straightforward in general how to in-
tegrate prior knowledge into a deep learning system:, in part because the
knowledge represented in deep learning systems pertains mainly to (largely
opaque) correlations between features, rather than to abstractions like quan-
tified statements (e.g. all men are mortal), see discussion of universally-
quantified one-to-one-mappings in Marcus (2001), or generics ....” (p. 11).
Similar things may be said about the SP system but, here, the problems
are likely to be less severe. This is because, in general, prior knowledge may
be represented in the same format as knowledge that the system learns for
itself.
Later in the same section, Marcus writes:
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“Problems that have less to do with categorization and more to
do with commonsense reasoning essentially lie outside the scope
of what deep learning is appropriate for, and so far as I can tell,
deep learning has little to offer such problems. In a recent review
of commonsense reasoning, Ernie Davis and I [5] began with a set
of easily-drawn inferences that people can readily answer with-
out anything like direct training, such as Who is taller, Prince
William or his baby son Prince George? Can you make a salad
out of a polyester shirt? If you stick a pin into a carrot, does it
make a hole in the carrot or in the pin?
“As far as I know, nobody has even tried to tackle this sort of
thing with deep learning.
“Such apparently simple problems require humans to integrate
knowledge across vastly disparate sources, and as such are a long
way from the sweet spot of deep learning-style perceptual classi-
fication. Instead, they are perhaps best thought of as a sign that
entirely different sorts of tools are needed, along with deep learn-
ing, if we are to reach human-level cognitive flexibility.” (p. 12).
It appears that the SP system has considerable potential with the kinds of
commonsense reasoning discussed by Davis and Marcus [5]. This is described
in [21], a detailed response to the issues raised in their paper.
3.7 Deep learning thus far cannot inherently distin-
guish causation from correlation (3.7)
Marcus [9, Section 3.7] writes: “If it is a truism that causation does not
equal correlation, the distinction between the two is also a serious concern for
deep learning. Roughly speaking, deep learning learns complex correlations
between input and output features, but with no inherent representation of
causality.” (p. 12–13).
It cannot be claimed that there is a comprehensive analysis, within the SP
system, of the difference between causation and correlation. But the system
does produce useful demonstrations of how such concepts may be modelled
in the system:
• Causation. In [18, Section 10.5] and [17, Section 7.9], there is a demon-
stration of how the SP system may serve in the causal diagnosis of
faults in an electronic circuit.
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• Correlation. In [18, Section 10.2] and [17, Section 7.8], there is an ex-
ample showing how Bayesian reasoning, with conditional probabilities
centre stage, may be modelled in the SP system.
3.8 Deep learning presumes a largely stable world, in
ways that may be problematic (3.8)
Marcus [9, Section 3.8] writes: “The logic of deep learning is such that it is
likely to work best in highly stable worlds, like the board game Go, which
has unvarying rules, and less well in systems such as politics and economics
that are constantly changing.” (p. 13).
Much the same may be said of the SP system, or any other system that
models the world via its statistical structure, which is the rule for most AI
systems.
The trick, of course, for people and for artificial systems, is to be prepared
for constant changes in the phenomena that one is modelling. And with
predictions in areas such as economics, there is the possibility that each
prediction itself may change what it is that is being predicted!
3.9 Deep learning thus far works well as an approxima-
tion, but its answers often cannot be fully trusted
(3.9)
Marcus [9, Section 3.9] notes that there are now many examples where deep
learning systems are fooled into making misclassifications which appear ec-
centric or bizarre to people. In [23, Section V-G] I have described similar
examples.
In the latter section I have written:
“With regard to the first kind of error—failing to recognise some-
thing that is almost identical to what has been recognised—there
is already evidence that the SP computer model would not make
that kind of mistake. It can recognise words containing errors
of omission, commission and substitution [17, Section 6.2.1], and
likewise for diseases in medical diagnosis viewed as pattern recog-
nition [16, Section 3.6] and in the parsing of natural language [2,
Section 4.2.2].
“No attempt has been made to test experimentally whether or
not the SP computer model is prone to the second kind of error—
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recognising abstract patterns as ordinary objects—but a knowl-
edge of how it works suggests that it would not be.”
In general, it seems that the SP system is unlikely to make the strange
errors of classification to which deep learning systems are prone.
3.10 Deep learning thus far is difficult to engineer with
(3.10)
Marcus [9, Section 3.10] writes:
“Another fact that follows from all the issues raised above is that
is simply hard to do robust engineering with deep learning. As a
team of authors at Google put it in 2014, in the title of an impor-
tant, and as yet unanswered essay [12], machine learning is ‘the
high-interest credit card of technical debt’, meaning that is com-
paratively easy to make systems that work in some limited set of
circumstances (short term gain), but quite difficult to guarantee
that they will work in alternative circumstances with novel data
that may not resemble previous training data (long term debt,
particularly if one system is used as an element in another larger
system).
“In an important talk at ICML, Leon Bottou [4] compared ma-
chine learning to the development of an airplane engine, and
noted that while the airplane design relies on building complex
systems out of simpler systems for which it was possible to create
sound guarantees about performance, machine learning lacks the
capacity to produce comparable guarantees. As Google’s Peter
Norvig [10] has noted, machine learning as yet lacks the incremen-
tality, transparency and debuggability of classical programming,
trading off a kind of simplicity for deep challenges in achieving
robustness.
“Henderson and colleagues have recently extended these points,
with a focus on deep reinforcement learning, noting some seri-
ous issues in the field related to robustness and replicability [6].”
(p. 14).
Evidence to date suggests that these remarks are unlikely to apply to the
SP system. Although development of the system has taken a long time, the
SP computer model now exhibits considerable stability and robustness, and
promises to provide a sound basis for scaling up with parallel processing, and
for further developments as noted in [18, Section 3.3].
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3.11 Catastrophic forgetting
A weakness of deep learning that was overlooked in the writing of [23] is
a problem called “catastrophic forgetting”, meaning the way in which new
learning in a deep learning system wipes out old memories. A solution has
been proposed in [8] but it appears to be partial, and it is unlikely to be
satisfactory in the long run.
The SP system is immune to any such influence in its learning. All learn-
ing is achieved by the addition of new SP-patterns to the system’s store of
SP-patterns, and, while there may be some merging of new information with
old information that is similar, new learning does not disturb old learning.
Of course, there may be a case for introducing some kind of forgetting
into the system, but the system as it is now does not forget.
3.12 Under- and over-generalisations and their correc-
tion
A general problem in any kind of learning system, especially the learning of a
natural language, is how to generalise ‘correctly’ from the finite sample of in-
formation which is the basis for learning—avoiding both over-generalisations
and under-generalisations. A related problem is learning from ‘dirty data’:
how to learn ‘correct’ structures despite the fact that most samples of data
contain ‘errors’—and this in the face of evidence that learning may be suc-
cessful without the opportunity for children to receive correction from adults
or older children.
Several solutions have been proposed for deep learning systems, some of
which are referenced in [23, Section V-N]. But I believe it is fair to say that
none of them are entirely satisfactory.
What I believe is a much better solution has been described in [18, Section
5.3] and in [23, Section V-N]. In brief:
1. Given a finite sample of data, I, compress it as much as possible to
yield a grammar, G, and an encoding, E, of I in terms of G.
2. In general, it will be found that G represents the ‘essence’ of I, with-
out over- or under-generalisations, and without ‘errors’ from the ‘dirty
data’.
Naturally, there are many associated issues that may be discussed but I
believe that the framework outlined here will prove to be sound.
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3.13 Psychology and neuroscience
It has long been recognised that deep learning systems are only loosely related
to any kind of structure or processing in the brain. More generally, research
on deep learning has been conducted largely without reference to what has
been learned about human learning, perception, and cognition, or what is
known about neuroscience.
By contrast, the SP system draws extensively on my own background
in cognitive psychology, and my extensive programme of research on the
learning of a first language or languages by children (summarised in [15]).
From its beginnings, the SP programme of research has been influenced
by a long-running theme, beginning with research by Fred Attneave [1], Ho-
race Barlow [2, 3] and others, pointing to the importance of information
compression in human learning, perception, and cognition.
It is also relevant to mention that abstract structures and processes in the
SP system, map quite neatly on to what appear to be plausible structures of
neurons and their interconnections, and how they may function, described in
[22].
3.14 Overarching theory
A variety of sources, perhaps most notably the work of Ray Solomonoff [13,
14] point to the importance of information compression in learning.
In research on deep learning in artificial neural networks, well reviewed
by Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber [11], there is some recognition of the importance of
information compression [11, Sections 4.2, 4.4, and 5.6.3], but it appears that
the idea is not well developed in deep learning systems.
By contrast, as readers may have learned from [18, 17], and may guess
from Section 3.12, the SP system is devoted to the compression of informa-
tion, and more precisely compression of information via the powerful concept
of SP-multiple-alignment, illustrated in Figure 1. There is much evidence in
support of this theory presented in [18, 17] and elsewhere.
In general, the SP system has a coherent overarching theory, something
which is largely missing from research in deep learning.
4 Potential risks of excessive hype
In [9, Section 4], Marcus writes:
“My own largest fear is that the field of AI could get trapped
in a local minimum, dwelling too heavily in the wrong part of
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intellectual space, focusing too much on the detailed exploration
of a particular class of accessible but limited models that are
geared around capturing low-hanging fruit—potentially neglect-
ing riskier excursions that might ultimately lead to a more robust
path.”
This chimes very much with my own experience. Despite many re-
spectable publications in the SP programme of research, and many useful
results, it has proved very difficult to get a hearing for this work by those
engaged in research on deep learning. It seems that the extraordinary enthu-
siasm for deep learning, perhaps coupled with the large amounts of money
being channelled into this area, has made it very difficult for researchers to
divert any of their attention to anything other than deep learning. One se-
nior researcher, who was kind enough to reply to one of my emails, said that
although the SP research may be interesting, he does not have the time to
look at it.
Good science and engineering is not like this. To solve difficult problems
it is necessary to maintain several paths through the search space, and for
researchers in any one area to be prepared to keep abreast of developments
in other areas. In keeping with that approach, the central aim of the SP
programme of research is simplification and integration of observations and
concepts across artificial intelligence, mainstream computing, mathematics,
and human learning, perception, and cognition.
Overspecialisation is a phenomenon noted by John Kelly and Steve
Hamm, both of IBM, in their book Smart Machines [7]. In connection with
research on different sensory modalities they write:
“In order to make this great leap and become true thinking ma-
chines, the cognitive systems of the future will integrate informa-
tion from multiple sensing technologies. Today, as scientists labor
to create machine technologies to augment our senses, there’s a
strong tendency to view each sensory field in isolation as special-
ists focus only on a single sensory capability. Experts in each
sense don’t read journals devoted to the others senses, and they
don’t attend one another’s conferences. Even within IBM, our
specialists in different sensing technologies don’t interact much.
Yet if machines are to help humans understand the world, they
have to make sense of it and communicate about it in a way
that’s familiar and comprehensible to humans. This integration
of data from various sensing technologies is beginning to happen
in multimedia and visual analytics, where vision and sound are
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correlated. But that’s just the start of what will be required in
the next era of computing. (p. 74).
5 What would be better?
In [9, Section 5], Marcus writes: “Despite all of the problems I have sketched,
I don’t think that we need to abandon deep learning. Rather, we need
to reconceptualize it: not as a universal solvent, but simply as one tool
among many, a power screwdriver in a world in which we also need hammers,
wrenches, and pliers, not to mentions chisels and drills, voltmeters, logic
probes, and oscilloscopes.” (p. 18).
Yes, of course, in the spirit of maintaining several paths through the
search space, it would be wrong to abandon all research on deep learning.
But there is certainly a need to open up other areas and I believe the SP
framework is one of them.
Regarding Marcus’s remarks about symbolic and sub-symbolic systems
[9, Section 5.2], I believe the SP system bridges that divide. In principle, it
may work at any level of granularity.
In connection with this: “The power and flexibility of the brain comes
in part from its capacity to dynamically integrate many different computa-
tions in real-time. The process of scene perception, for instance, seamlessly
integrates direct sensory information with complex abstractions about ob-
jects and their properties, lighting sources, and so forth.” (p. 20), a major
strength of the SP system, due largely to the powerful concept of SP-multiple-
alignment, is the ability of the system to integrate diverse kinds of knowledge
and diverse aspects of intelligence, in any combination.
As may be seen from Section 3.13, I agree very much that we should build
“models that are motivated not just by mathematics but also by clues from
the strengths of human psychology.” (p. 21).
6 Conclusion
The gist of this paper is that, while research on deep learning should certainly
continue, the SP programme of research also merits attention. In that con-
nection, the SP system has several advantages compared with deep learning
systems. The main ones are:
• Quantities of data and one-trial learning (Section 3.1). By contrast
with deep learning systems, the SP system can produce meaningful
results with quite small amounts of data. It provides a model for the
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way in which people can learn from a single exposure or experience. At
the same time it provides an explanation for why it takes time to learn
complex skills.
• Hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures (Section 3.3). Unlike deep
learning systems—which do no lend themselves well to the representa-
tion of hierarchical structures—the SP system, via the concept of SP-
multiple-alignment, accommodates such structures very well. At the
same time, it also provides for the representation of non-hierarchical
structures.
• Reasoning (Sections 3.4 and 3.6). Although no attempt has yet been
made to explore whether or how the SP system may perform ‘open
ended’ inference, the SP system has—unlike deep learning systems—
strengths in several different kinds of reasoning. It also has strengths
in ‘commonsense’ reasoning, as described in [21].
• Transparency (Section 3.5). By contrast with deep learning systems,
the SP system provides complete transparency in the way in which
it represents knowledge and it provides a full audit trail for all its
processing.
• It is unlikely that an SP system would be easily fooled (Section 3.9).
Deep learning systems can misclassify stimuli in ways that people find
eccentric or bizarre. Experience with the SP system, and a knowledge
of how it works, suggests that it would be unlikely to make that kind
of error.
• Catastrophic forgetting (Section 3.11). A striking weakness of deep
learning systems is ‘catastrophic forgetting’—the way in which new
learning wipes out old learning. The SP system does not suffer from
this problem because new learning does not disturb old learning.
• Correction of over- and under-generalisations, and learning from ‘dirty
data’ (Section 3.12). With deep learning systems, a variety of solutions
have been proposed for how to generalise correctly from a sample of
data, without over- or under-generalisation, but it appears that none
of them are entirely satisfactory. By contrast, the SP system proposes
a theoretically-coherent solution that flows from the core theory in the
system. Those same principles provide an explanation of how learning
can be successful, despite errors in the data which is the basis for
learning.
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• Psychology and neuroscience (Section 3.13). By contrast with deep
learning systems, which have long been recognised as being only loosely
related to what is known about the workings of the human brain, the SP
system draws extensively on research on human learning, perception,
and cognition. The SP system also suggests how abstract structures
and processes in the system may be realised in terms of neurons and
their interconnections.
• Overarching theory (Section 3.14). The central principle in the SP the-
ory, derived from much research in cognitive psychology and supported
by much evidence, is that much of human learning, perception, and
cognition, may be understood as compression of information via the
concept of SP-multiple-alignment. By contrast, deep learning systems
have little or no over-arching theory.
In general, I believe that SP system provides a much firmer foundation
than deep learning for the development of artificial general intelligence.
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